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CASES NOTED
TORTS - LIABILITY OF STATE FOR TORTIOUS ACTS
OF ITS EMPLOYEES
A county clerk, acting as agent for the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
issued a certificate of registration of title to an automobile thief. The
certificate of title was issued on a certificate of sale known to the clerk to
have been stolen. The claimant purchased an automobile in reliance on this
certificate of title, rcturned the automobile to its rightful owner and
brought this action against thc state of New York. Held, claimant awarded
the purchase price of the automobile. Paglia v. State, 99 N.Y.S.2d 878
(Ct. Cl. 1950).
A state's sovereignty precludes it from being answerable in damages
for injury resulting from the negligence of its agents.' This immunity is
based on the common law doctrine that "the king can do no wrong,"2 and
applies not only to governmental functions but to other activities as well.?
The injured party is not deprived of his remedy against the tort-feasor, but
the doctrine of respondeat superior is held to be inapplicable.4 When not
restricted by its constitution a state may, by statute, assume liability for the
torts of its officers, agents, and servants. " Such legislation can limit the
liability and prescribe the terms of its imposition.6 Statutes in derogation
of sovereignty must clearly express a waiver of immunity and be strictly
construed .
The waiver of such immunity in the New York Court of Claims Act'
is broad9 and has extended that state's liability to a point equal td that of
an individual or a corporation.10 In the principal case the court based lia-
bility on the principle that one, in undertaking to do an act, although under
no duty to do so, must perform it in a careful and prudent manner."' While
1. Evans v. Marsh, 158 Kan. 43, 145 P.2d 140 (1944); Benjamin Foster Co. v.
Commonwealth, 318 Mass. 190, 61 N.E.2d 147 (1945); see United States v. Moscow
Seed Co., 14 F. Supp. 135, 136 (C.D. Idaho 1936).
2. Moore v. Walker County, 236 Ala. 688, 690, 185 So. 175, 177 (1938).
3. Melvin v. State, 121 Cal. 16, 53 Pac. 416 (1898) (injury at state fair from faulty
bleachers); Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 Pac. 450 (1912) (injury incurred when
railing in state leased arnory gave way. Contra; Muses v. Housing Authority of San
Francisco, 83 Cal.App.2d 489, 189 P.2d 305 (1948)(housing authority entered com-
petition with industry and labor and must be subject to the same liability).
4. Davie v. Regents of University of California, 66 Cal. App. 689, 227 Pac. 247
(1924); Heiser v. Severy, 117 Mont. 105, 158 P.2d 501 (1945).
5. Nordby v. Department of Public Works, 60 Idaho 475, 92 P.2d 789 (1939);
McNair v. State, 305 Mich. 181, 9 N.W.2d 52 (1943).
6. See Mills v. Stewat, 76 Mont. 429, 444, 247 Pac. 332, 336 (1926).
7. Goldstein v. State, 281 N.Y. 396, 23 N.E.2d 97 (1939); see Smith v. State, 227
N.Y. 405, 410, 125 N.E. 841, 842 (1920).
8. N.Y. COURT OF CLaiMs ACT § i2a.
9. See Metildi v. State, 177 Misc. 179, 180, 30 N.Y.S.2d 168, 169 (Ct. Cl. 1941);
Green v. State, 160 Misc. 398, 290 N.Y. Supp. 36, 39 (Ct. CI. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 278 N.Y. 15, 14 N.E.2d 833 (1938).
10. Adams v. State, 264 App. Div. 978, 37 N.Y.S.2d 229 (3d Dep't 1942); Robison
v. State, 263 App. Div. 240, 32 N.Y.S.2d 388 (4th Dep't 1942).
11. Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 157 N.E. 129 (1927); Glanzer v.
Shcpard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 129 (1927).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
this seems to go to great length in imposing liability on the state, still, it is
within the spirit of the act,'2 and the result does not stand alone in unique-
ness. 13
The expansion of governmental activities and the every-day contact a
citizen is required to have with these activities creates a need for legislation
with results comparable to that reached in the instant case. The State of
New York has provided for that need, and in so doing has set an example
that may well be followed by other states.
TRUSTS - ANNUITIES - ANNUITANTS' CLAIM
FOR PRINCIPAL SUM
A testator bequeathed annuities to named non-profit corporations for
the benefit of his nieces for their lives. The annuitants claimed the right
to take the principal sum bequeathed rather than the annuities. Held, that
the annuitants cannot take the principal sum since the named corporations
have a clear interest in the bequests of which they cannot be deprived by
being compelled to turn over the entire fund to the annuitants. Gilbert v.
Findlay College, 74 A.2d 36 (Md. 1950).
English courts, since 1797, have followed the rule that where an abso-
lute annuity is given in a will, the annuitant has the right to elect to take
the principal sum bequeathed for purchase of the annuity, in lieu of the
annuity.' The courts reason-that enforcement of the purchase of the
annuity would be nugatory and vain since the annuitant could sell the
annuity the minute after it was purchased. In early American cases on this
subject, the courts of Massachusetts and New York3 adopted the English
reasoning and applied their rule. Despite a testator's direction to the con-
trary, the rule was applied and the annuitant was given the right of election
12. See Jackson v. State, 261 N.Y. 134, 138, 184 N.E. 735, 736 (1933) (in which
the court said, "The statute constitutes a recognition and acknowledgment of a moral duty
demanded by the principles of equity and justice.").
13. Metildi v. State, supra note 9 (failure of building inspector to warn workmen of
dangerous condition of building being demolished was negligence sufficient to state a cause
of action); Kittle v. State, 345 App. Div. 401, 284 N.Y. Supp. 657 (3d Dep't 1935),
4ff'd, 272 N.Y. 420, 2 N.E.Zd 850 (1936) (failure to warn invitee of danger in state park,
or to erect guard rails constituted negligence creating liability against state); Tortora v.
State, 244 App. Div. 861, 279 N.Y. Supp. 794 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 269 N.Y. 167, 199 N.E.
44 (1935)(having undertaken to furnish prisoners with heated shelter, state was liable for
injury caused by negligent operation of stove).
1. Barnes v. Rowley, 3 Ves. Jr. 305, 30 Eng. Rep. 1024 (1797); Bailey v. Bishop,
9 Ves. Jr. 6, 32 Eng. Rep. 501 (1803); Palmer v. Crawford, 3 Swan 483, 36 Eng. Rep.
945 (1819); Dawson v. Hearn, I Russ. & M. 606, 39 Eng. Rep. 232 (1831); Ford v.
Batley, 17 Beav. 303, 23 L.J.Ch. 225, 51 Eng. Rep. 1051 (1860); Re Mabbett, Pittman
v. Holborrow, 1 Ch. 707 (1891).
2. Parker v. Cobe, 208 Mass. 260, 94 N.E. 476, (1911).
3. In re Cole's Estate, 219 N.Y. 435, 114 N.E. 785 (1916); Reid v. Brown, 54
Misc. 481, 106 N.Y. Supp. 27 (Surr. Ct. 1907).
